Chicken Strategy 2: Shoot the Driver

Topic: Iran's nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, quits
Ref: Ahmadinajed's Chicken Strategy

Like any other such developments on the Iranian political stage, the unexpected replacement of Mr. Larijani with Mr. Jalili is replete with intricate and often invisible dimensions that make accurate assessments highly difficult, and is likely to keep Iran analysts busy for a while to come. But even so, a few basic points deserve mention here.

The first notable issue of this story is perhaps that the Iranian Nuclear train is in turbulance. For a train whose brake, Mr. Ahmadinejad announced not long ago, has been broken off and is speeding on its downhill tracks, a turbulance of this magnitude can signify severe trouble. So even though the real reasons behind this abrupt shift may take a while to surface, and though only time can show the actual outcome of this move, the alarms have nonetheless gone off all around Iran, with analysts are interpreting Mr. Ahmadinejad's most recent move as anything from a disasterous mistake to a downright coup.

One of the first questions asked is this: "should the ommission of Mr. Larijani be read as an attempt at ommiting or at any rate weakening the influence of the Supreme Leader ?" Larijani was, after all, Ayatollah Khamenei's represenative. The fact is that some observers had already proposed a coup theory the day when Ahmadinejad annouced he has thrown away the brakes of the Iranian Atomic Train. It may not be so far from reality, in other words, to consider the change as another little page turned for the coup theory.

On the other hand, a quick review of Saeed Jalili's talks and interviews show a clear and stable feature, namely a quality of constantly adhering to the main basic policy lines of the Islamic Republic. There is in fact something of a striking exaggeration in his style of 'adherence' that makes it almost impossible to see the real person in him. He is so well trained in speaking simply the basic policy lines instead of making any opinions, that gives one the impression of a recorded machine. His real duty seems to be simply finding out which recorded message would be the closest to the posed question, and to push the 'play' button to the right message. In addition to that, according to Reuters, "Diplomats who have met Jalili say he expresses strongly held convictions and sticks firmly to his position in discussions. One diplomat said he 'specializes in monologue' rather than debate."

Given the common belief that Mr. Ahmadinejad has indeed been selecting his surroundings figures from people who would a) be of the same fanatical convictions as he is, and b) struggle for his ideals with highest loyalty and least 'character', many are afraid that this latest shuffle is yet another step in the direction of a hegemony of fanatical messianism. Such a selection appears indeed more bleak, given the sensitive moments Iranian diplomacy machine is facing (and that due mainly to Mr. Ahmadinejad's unidirectionaly policies and rhetorics), and that rather than messaging boxes and broken records, the Iranians need people of character and integrity with high capacity of innovative thinking and strategic flexibility, if they are ever to save themselves from the death trap Mr Ahmadinejad's brakeless train is rushing them into.

With this latest stunt for remote controlling the atomic negotiations in Europe, Mr Ahmadinejad appears to have managed to throw the driver off his already brakeless train.

Saeed Jalili, Interview with Boston Globe
Reuters Factbox on Saeed Jalili

زائيدن گاو هسته اى ايران

با كنار رفتن لاريجانى و امدن كسى مثل جليلى به جاى وى ، بى اختيار به ياد عكسى افتادم كه كسى تيتر كرده بود، "زندگى بدتر از اين هم ميتواند بشود!" ۰ محتواي ان عكس را اگر ميدانيد كه خوب، و اگر نه بگذاريد فعلا صحبت نكنيم ازش . مثل هر اتفاق مهم ديگرى در صحنه سياسى امروز ايران، آن رفتن و اين آمدن جنبه هاى فراوان، پيچيده ، نامرئى و اغلب غير قابل پيشگوئى دارد كه به هر حال تا مدتى تحليل گر ها را مشغول نگه خواهد داشت ، اما چند نكته از اين داستان مستقيم چشم را ميگيرند ، كه شايسته ذكراست۰

اولين نكته مهم اين داستان شايد اين باشد كه قطار هسته اي ايران در تلاطم است . و براى قطارى كه ترمزش را كنده و به دور انداخته اند و با سرعت مضاعف در سراشيب تاريخ ميراند ، تلاطم و بحرانى در اين حد نشان از وضعيتى بسيار خطرناك ميتواند داشته باشد۰ بنا بر اين، اگرچه دلائل واقعى اين تبديلات سريع و حيرت انگيز ، و نتيجه عملى اين تلاطم و تغيير را تنها زمان ميتواند نشان دهد، اما زنگهاى خطر بى شك در گوش هر بيننده دلسوزى بايد به صدا در آيد ۰

يكى از اولين سئوالاتى كه اغلب ناظران در اين قضيه از خود ميپرسند ان است كه ايا حذف لاريجانى را بايست به معنى حذف يا تضعيف نفوذ رهبرى در هدايت قطار اتمى دانست يا خير . حقيقت ان است كه از همان روزى كه احمدى نژاد اعلام كرد ترمزهاى قطار را به دور انداخته است ، برخى اين اظهار وى را در حكم اعلان آغاز كوچك يك كودتاى بزرگ در دل سيستم جمهورى اسلامى محسوب داشتند. شايد دور از واقعيت نباشد اگر اين جديد ترين برگ داستان سفر اتمى ايران را نيز به عنوان سر اغاز فصل جديدى از كودتاى مذكور خواند ، اگر چه در حال حاضر هنوز شواهد كافى براى اين چنين تحليلى در دسترس نيست .

از سوى ديگر، مرورى سريع بر گفتگوها و مصاحبه هاى گذشته اقاى سعيد جليلى ، جانشين لاريجانى ، نشانگر آن است كه از مشخصات آقاى جليلى محدود كردن كامل سخنان و برخوردهاى خويش به خطوط اصلى گفتمان رسمى دولت است۰ به عبارت ديگر، انچه در اغلب گفتگوها با وى به چشم ميخورد ان است كه اقاى جليلى تا ان حد در كنار گذاشتن افكار و ديدگاههاى شخصى خود از اظهاراتش مصر و موفق است كه سخنان وى اغلب شبيهند به پيغام هائى كه از قبل ضبط شده اند و انگار در مقابل سئوال هاى مختلف، وظيفه اصلى ايشان ان بوده كه پيغام مناسب را بيابد و دكمه شروع ان را بفشارد۰ نكته قابل اعتناى ديگر انست كه متاسفانه از شواهد امر و روند دوسال گذشته رياست اقاى احمدى نژاد نيز ميتوان به راحتى اين تعبير را برگرفت كه شايد دليل اصلى انتخاب جليلى به جاى لاريجانى همين صفت تسليم محض باشد . واضح است كه در اينصورت ميتوان انتظار داشت كه مسائل اساسى جديدى گريبانگير ديناميزم ديپلماسى حساس هسته اي ايران گردند . براى عبور موفقيت اميز از بحران هائى در حد بحران بين المللى كه امروز ايران به يمن سياستهاى تك منظوره اقاى احمدى نژاد با ان روبروميباشد ، ماشين ديپلماسى ايران به جاى پيغام گيرهاى اتوماتيك نياز به افرادى دارد كه بتوانند با استفاده از هوش و موقع بينى خود انعطاف لازم را براى مانور هاى تاكتيكى و شبه-تغيير هاى موضعى در حين معامله داشته باشند ۰ اگرچه شايد اقاى جليلى كانديداى بسيار مناسبى براى گوش فرا دادن و اجراى دقيق خواسته هاى اقاى احمدى نژاد باشد ، متاسفانه اين صفات از وى الزاما ديپلمات موفقى نميسازند، اما مناسبات اتمى ترمز بريده ايران امروز بيش از هر زمان به ديپلماتى قوى و موفق احتياج دارد۰،

چنين به نظر ميرسد كه در تلاش خود براى كنترل از راه دور ديپلماسى هسته اي كشور ، اقاى احمدى نژاد كابوس بريده شدن فرمان اين قطار بى ترمز را نيز بر دغدغه هاى دلسوزان افزوده است

مصاحبه جليلى با بوستون گلوب

جامعه ايرانى و معضلى به نام پذيرفتن مسئوليت اعمال خويشتن

موضوع پذيرفتن مسئوليت اعمال خويشتن يكى از مفاهيم ابتدائى و شالوده اى در اغلب مكاتب روان شناسى سلامت و موفقيت اجتماعى و فردى است ۰ از مكتب هاى عرفانى گرفته تا مدرسه هاى علمى كمابيش همه بر اين نكته اتفاق دارند كه اولين قدم در راه بهبودى و خروج از بن بست هاى مخرب در زندگى اين است كه فرد متوجه شود كه مسئله از آن خود وى است، و نه ديگرى ۰ تا وقتى كه اين اتفاق ظاهرا ساده نيافتاده باشد ، فرد دليلى نخواهد داشت كه به تغيير دادن جنبه يا جنبه هائى از زندگى خود بپردازد۰ چرا خود را سرزنش كنيم، وقتى ميشود ديگرى را مسئول كمبودها و مسائل خود بدانيم ؟

اما نكته اين كه همين مفهوم را در مقياس وسيعتر ميتوان به زندگى و مشكلات اجتماعى و جمعى يك گروه از افراد نيز تعميم داد ۰ مردم خودمان در ايران را در نظر بگيريم . اين يك حقيقت ساده است، مثلا، كه رژيم جمهورى اسلامى و جنبه هاى مختلف اجتماعى، سياسى، مذهبى ، اخلاقى و معنوى ان يك پديده 'ايرانى' است۰ يعنى پديده اى است كه از دل جامعه ايرانى به دنيا آمده است و به واسطه افكار، ديدگاهها، عقايد، وحشت ها، اميدها و باورهاى آن جامعه حفظ گرديده است و به عنوان يك سيستم سياسى و اجتماعى ريشه گسترانده است ۰ مفهوم ساده اى است . يعنى مگر انكه عقيده داشته باشيم جمهورى اسلامى را قدرتهاى خارجى به وجود اورده اند (كه متاسفانه شايد برخى حقيقتا هم اينظور بيانديشند)، در غير ان صورت گريزى از اعتراف به اين حقيقت نخواهيم داشت كه جمهورى اسلامى در واقع آئينه اى است از تمايلات و توقعات جمعى ايرانيان . اما كم نيستند كسانى از ما كه قبول اين مفهوم با همه سادگى ان برايشان ممكن نيست۰

بگذاريد يك موضوع شناخته شده را درر نظر بگيريم مثلا، مثل قضيه حجاب و اجبارى بودن آن در ايران۰ سالها پيش ، در سال ۱۳۵۷ ، روزنامه اطلاعات شماره اى منتشر كرد كه سر تيترش بود، "در مورد حجاب اجبارى در كار نيست" و پائين تر هم ادامه داده بود، 'مزاحمان خانمهاى بى حجاب ضد انقلاب هستند' ۰ اين شماره روزنامه اطلاعات خيلى معروف شده، و حتما شما هم ديده ايد، و هر چند وقتى يك بار هم جائى عكسش را ميزنند و بحث ميكنند كه چه شد و چطور شد كه مملكت به جائى رسيد كه الان جمهورى اسلامى حجاب را اجبارى كرده است و ماموران خودش را هم رسما به خيابانها ميفرستد تا مزاحم خانمهائى شوند كه حجابشان سخت و كامل نيست ۰ اما يك موضوع اساسى كه تقريبا هر بار كه اين بحثها راه ميافتد كاملا از محدوده بحث خارج ميماند همين است كه واقعا تا چه حد اين حجاب اجبارى و حركتى كه به سوى اجبارى شدن حجاب در ايران رخ داده است را ميشود مربوط دانست به خواسته عامه مردم ۰ به عبارت ديگر، هيچ جا من اين بحث را نديده ام تا حالا كه كسى بگويد " اگر نگاه كنيم ميبينيم كه اكثريت مردان كشور ترجيحشان اينست كه زنشان از چشم مردان ديگر پوشيده بماند ، خواهرشان و مادرشان هم همينطور. پس شايد اين موضوع حجاب در واقع برآيندى از اراده جمعى ايرانى ها باشد" ۰ يا اين را نديده ام تا حالا كه كسى اقرار يا اصرار كند كه "من هم به عنوان يك ايرانى در نهايت نقش دارم در اين موضوع كه حجاب در ايران به زنها تحميل ميشود " و به اين ترتيب شخصا احساس مسئوليت كند و از خودش بپرسد، "راستى نقش من در اين ماجرا چه ميتواند باشد و آيا من هم مسئوليتى دارم در قبال اين تحميل ؟"۰

من خودم دوستى دارم در يكى از شهرستانها ، كه برايم نمونه روشنى از اين حكايت است ۰ دخترى از اعضاى خانواده اين دوست من سالها پيش با سرپيچى از مردان و بزرگتران خانواده ، دوست پسرى انتخاب كرد و با وجود اعتراض و مقاومت شديد انها ، در نهايت با ان پسر ازدواج كرد . خانواده دوست من ان دختر را از خودشان راندند، با اين بهانه كه ابروى خانواده را برده است و بايد طرد شود ۰ همين دوست عزيز من تا امروز كه سالها از ان داستان ميگذرد هنوز ان دختر را --كه حالا زنى شده ميانسال-- به ديده نتفر و انزجار نگاه ميكند ، جائى كه او باشد نميرود و با او صحبت نميكند ، چرا كه اين زن با سر پيچى از قوانين مرد سالارانه خانواده و شهرستانش موجب بى ابروئى براى خانواده شده است ۰ خوب ، حالا همين دوست عزيز با همين داستان، بار ها و بارها شده است كه از فشارهاى جمهورى اسلامى و بسته بودن جامعه و عدم آزادى بيان و عقيده ، و حتى از اجبارى بودن حجاب در ايران شكايت كرده است ، ان هم با كمال احساس حق به جانبى و مظلوميت ، و اين احساس كه اينها را يك دولت بدجنس و ديكتاتور دارد به مردم تحميل ميكند . البته نتيجه اخلاقى اين داستان شايد بيش از معمول واضح باشد، و هميشه حكايت به اين روشنى نيست ، اما داستان داستانى واقعى است، و براى روشن كردن مطلب شايد مثال مفيدى باشد ۰

نكته اين داستان دوست من را بايستى گسترده تر و اساسى تر از مسئله حجاب ديد ، نكته اى كه بايست ختم شود به تحليلى بزرگتر ، از روش ادراك در جامعه ما ، و اين روند كلى كه نقش خودمان در به وجود امدن و ادامه شرائط سياسى و اجتماعى زندگى جمعى مان را به ندرت جدى ميگيريم ۰ توضيح ان هم شايد خيلى پيچيده نباشد۰ به هر حال هزاران سال در جامعه اى زندگى كرده ايم كه تصميمها را برايمان گرفته اند و احساس كرده ايم نقشى نداريم در روند هاى بزرگ سياسى ، يعنى قدرت تصميم گيرى را به 'ديگران' وا گذاشته ايم۰ بلوغ از بى مسئوليتى و بى قدرتى كودكى به احساس مسئوليت و قدرت بزرگسالانه هم اتفاقى نيست كه يك شبه بيافتد، و همانطور سالهاى طولانى كودكى را از بزرگى جدا ميكنند، ساليان متعددى هم بلوغ اجتماعى يك جامعه را از شكل گيرى ابتدائى ان به عنوان يك جامعه سياسى جدا ميكنند۰ .

شايد اشتباه نباشد اگر ملت ايران را در مرحله كذار از طفوليت سياسى به بلوغ مسئوليت پذيرى ببينيم . به مانند سرپيچى هاى دوران بلوغ ، انقلاب سال ۵۷ براى اولين بار به 'ما' نشان داد كه به محض اينكه 'بخواهيم' ميتوانيم سرنوشت خودمان را در دست بگيريم و عوض كنيم ، نشان داد كه ميتوانيم پدر و سالار مان را هم تحت كنترل خود درآوريم و زندگى جديدى را شروع كنيم. اما شايد هنوز ذهن جمعى ما به سن رشدى نرسيده بود كه اين درس ساده را از آن اتفاق بزرگ بگيرد ، توفيدن خودمان را هم به حساب ديگرى نوشتيم ، و گرچه پدررا از خانه اخراج كرديم، اولين مردى را كه از در وارد شد 'پدر' خوانديم و به اتاق پدر هدايتش كرديم ۰ شايد انقلاب به ما نشان داد كه اگر بخواهيم ميتوانيم، اما مسئله اساسى اينجاست كه براى خواستن و توانستن هنوز احتياج به عبور از يك پله ديگرى داريم به اسم 'دانستن'، و 'خود اگاهى' ، پله اى كه ظاهرا هنوز پاهاى كوفته مان ياراى صعودش را نيافته ۰

Boiling Frogs and Burning Chickens: Myth and Madness in Ahmadinejad’s Politics

With every passing day the drums of war are beaten harder and louder. Ironically enough, however, with each passing day it becomes also more and more difficult within Iran to speak of war and to warn of its terrible destructiveness. On Monday, September 10, El-Baradei walked out of a UN meeting in Brussels in objection to what in his mind amounted to some European leadrs’ bellicose path of collision with Iran . In one of his first comments on the issue, on August 27, France’s new president, Sarkozy, warned of the "catastrophic alternative: an Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran," and not long after, on Sept. 16, his Foreign Affairs minister, Bernard Kouchner, warned the world to “prepare for war with Iran.”

Despite all this, however, the Iranian stance continues along the double lines of belligerence and denial. If you are asking ‘why’, then you are precisely where I have found myself again and again, at least for the past two years –ever since the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s presidency term, to be more specific. And the single disturbing answer I have come up with, again and again, passes through the dark and twisted mental alleys of a character known commonly as Hassan Abbasi (though some would recognize him as Yadollah Qazvini). Let me explain.

About a year ago, on Jan 22, 2006, Elaine Shannon wrote an article in Time Magazine titled, ‘A Slow Iran Squeeze’. In her article Shannon said she had learned from an EU diplomat that “Western nations have been mapping out a careful, incremental plan” to stop Iran’s plans of developing nuclear technology and becoming a local power. That plan was presumably developed by Condoleezza Rice, and her British, French and German counterparts. The slow squeeze strategy, wrote Shannon, is known informally as the frog strategy, referring to a trick for cooking live frogs: you don’t throw a frog into hot water, it will hop right out of the pot, instead, you put the frog in a pot of cold water, then slowly raise the heat so that by the time the frog feels the need to jump out it is already too late and its muscles have long given way. “This time,” said the EU diplomat to Shannon, “it will be an Iranian frog”. Though Shannon didn’t tell her readers, when the diplomat said “this time,” he was making an implicit reference to a recent success story of the frog strategy, where Saddam was cooked at a pace that by the time the pot came to full boiling he was far too helpless to avoid ending on the dinner plate.

The frog strategy approach has so far worked very nicely with Iran as well. The frog is still in the pot, and though bubbles are clearly forming on the bottom and, for all means and purposes, the boiling point is well in view, President Ahmadinejad announced recently (Sept. 2, 2007), that God and mathematical calculations have made it clear to him that the United States will not attack Iran. So once again we find ourselves back to the opening question, why does Ahmadinejad act the way he does ? How can it be that not only reformists like former president, Khatami, but even prominent conservative figures like the head of the Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani, or former military commander, Mohsen Rezai, are cautioning against extreme behavior and rash reactions, yet Ahmadinejad and his camp insist on minimizing the threat of a military attack, ridicule those who advise caution, and announced that they have torn and thrown away the brakes from the ‘Iranian nuclear train’? It is precisely at this point, as I said earlier, that we find traces of the warped mind of a certain Professor Hassan Abbasi.

Over the course of a few years leading to and through the presidency of Ahmadinejad, Hassan Abbasi gave an unusually large number of talks across Iran and published prolifically on paper and on the internet, leaving anybody interested a huge body of thoughts and ideas that, though bordering on lunacy, provide a wonderful source of information for understanding many of the points of views expressed by Ahmadinejad and his government. The relationship is of course not accidental. In 2004, Michael Ledeen (whom, incidentally, Abbasi has called ‘the second thinking brain of the American conservatives’), wrote an article about the Iranian situation, titled ‘No Way Out’, in which he introduced Abbasi as “a well-known Iranian political scientist, longtime top official of the Revolutionary Guards, and currently ‘theoretician’ in the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the head of the National Security and Strategic Research Center”. Abbasi, added Ledeen, “holds special responsibility for North American affairs.” Two years after Ledeen’s report and well into Ahmadinejad’s term, In 2006 Amir Taheri, a prominent Iran Analyst, described Abbasi as, “professor of strategy at the Islamic Republic's Revolutionary Guard Corps University,” and “the principal foreign policy voice in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's new radical administration.”

Among Hassan Abbasi’s writings one article is of special interest to me here, one which is available also (in Persian) at Abbasi’s own website, ‘Doctrinal Analysis for Security without Borders’. The paper is titled “Frog Strategy: Dimensions and Possibilities”. As the title says, this is an article about a notion pointed out by some, including Shannon, that the United States is following the strategy of gradual squeeze, or the Frog Strategy, in the case of Iran. The paper is too long and complicated to detail here, but let me translate the very last section of it, where Abbasi concludes his analysis by suggesting how Iran should regulate its foreign policy in response to the American Frog Strategy. He writes,

But what should Iran’s response to the Frog Strategy be ? The simplest way is to attack the enemy’s strategy.

The Frog Strategy, like the West’s earlier strategies against Iran, is an insulting one. By persisting on “Chicken Strategy” we can emphasize and lean on an honorable approach of matching strategies.

Regardless of the outstanding capacities of the Chicken Strategy … we can replace the classic Phoenix Strategy for the Frog Strategy. In that situation the “Doctrine of Nimrod’s Nose” and the Strategy of “Abraham’s Fire Garden” will counter and cancel the Frog Strategy.

Don’t worry if this translation strikes you as bizarre, the original text sounds no less so. And if you find yourself starting to ask ‘but how can these strange ideas be taken seriously by Ahadinejad,” stop and remind yourself that Ahmadinejad is the person who spoke of a halo having surrounded him when he talked at the United Nations, or who once told his audience the story of a sixteen year old Iranian girl who had produced Atomic Energy in their basement. And yes, both these claims are captured on video and available on Youtube.

The so called ‘Chicken Strategy’ that Abbasi is recommending is what is known in Game Theory as the Hawk-Dove Game, or The Game of Chicken. Think of Rbel Without a Cause, and the scene where Jim (James Dean) and Buzz (Corey Allen) are driving towards the cliff with the idea that whoever ‘chickens out’ loses the game, and with it all respect in his peers’ eyes. The other variant, that Abbasi describes in his paper, is the scenario when two drivers drive towards each other on a line of collision. Again, the drivers need to decide how close the imminent collision is, and when or if they should turn to one side, jump out of the car or wait for the other to jump out first. So let’s recap this. Abbasi is giving the strategic consult to President Ahmadinejad, that the way to counter the Americans’ Frog strategy is to push with the Chicken Strategy. In fact in an other article he even goes into greater details to describe the various tricks the Iranian government can undertake to ‘win’ this game of chicken . Those range from wearing sunglasses so the other cannot read your emotion, to honking the horn and flashing the lights to distract and agitate the opponent, all the way to finally tearing off and throwing out the driving wheel.

It would be only too obvious to anybody who has followed the policies of Ahmadinejad’s administration to recognize how he has put to good practice his guru’s advice, be it in the standoff over the Iranian Atomic technology, or in the face of the growing threat of an American attack. His by now infamous mode of defiance and bold statements, his threats, and even his statement that ‘we have torn off the brake of the Iranian Atomic train and thrown it out of the window’, all have clear traces of Abbasi’s ‘strategic’ advice. In fact even the letters that Ahmadinejad famously wrote to G. W. Bush and other heads of powerful states was following the suggestion made by Abbasi.

Some may feel something of a relief, to hear what I have just said. After all, it is much more comforting to know that you are dealing with a bluffing trickster than to think you have a madman on your hand. But, I’m afraid, the situation is in fact more frightening than this, for at least two significant reasons. One reason is that to truly understand the confrontation between Iran and the United States as a game of chicken is a hugely misguided error whose price will be paid by many an innocent, in flesh and blood. It is misguided because the game of chicken has two sides, both of whom similarly vulnerable to the possible disastrous ending. Whichever driver falls off the cliff or crashes into the other is likely to die. The difference between this and a possible military confrontation between Iran and the United States is only too obvious. The good analogy for Iran and the States crashing into each other would be more like a bird running into a Boeing 747 engine, than two cars colliding –they will not get hurt in similar ways. Playing chicken against the mighty United States sounds more like a sad joke at the end of which either Iran gets destroyed, or Iran gets destroyed.

The second still more tragic reason why the situation may be more frightening than it appears is that for Ahmadinejad and Abbasi, the game of chicken is actually not even the real strategy, in the normal sense of the term. In other words, they are not just bluffing. The reality is that for people like Ahmadinejad or Abbasi, the game is an open ended one, because the real strategy is a suicidal one: “regardless of the outstanding capacities of the Chicken strategy,” said Abbasi, “we can replace the classic Phoenix strategy for the Frog strategy.” Let me refresh your memory, that the Phoenix is a mythical bird that commits suicide by making a large fire and burning itself in it, with the idea that from its ashes a new Phoenix will rise. And if the Phoenix reference is not unambiguous enough, ‘the strategy of Abraham’s Fire Garden’ is a precise expression of the same mélange of magical thinking and suicidal resolve. According to the Quran, one day when his entire town were out to celebrate a religious occasion, Abraham picked up his ax, headed for the main temple, and shattered all the idols. Abraham’s crazy plot was not simply intolerant and violent, it was also obviously suicidal, since he was the only person in town that day, and since, to make sure he will be recognized, he also left his ax at the temple, hanging from the last standing idol. On his return, King Nimrod duly ordered a great fire and had Abraham thrown into it, at which time Allah interfered so that when the fire was over, people found Abraham soundly smiling in the middle of the ashes. So the basic shared elements of the Phoenix and Abraham’s Fire Garden strategies are quite clear: they are both modeled on the magical idea of divinely protected immortality or indestructibility, and they both culminate in suicidal acts of self destruction –except in this case they will be annihilating a whole country with them. It should be hardly striking then, to learn that the same Dr. Hassan Abbasi who advised the Phoenix and Abraham’s Fire Garden strategies was also the master mind behind the creation and organization of Iran’s first ever suicide bombing squads, known as the ‘Special Units of Martyrdom Seekers’, not long after Mr. Ahmadinejad started his term.

Far beyond a macho game of chicken, Mr. Ahmadinejad and his strategists are speeding the Iranian train on a fanatical suicide mission. Are we going to help them blow to pieces the nation they have taken hostage ?

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